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THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKS IN THE MORTGAGE 
MELTDOWN: DID INVESTORS SLIP THROUGH THE HOLES IN 
SOX? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, he 
announced “with a tough new law we will act against those who have shaken 
confidence in our markets, using the full authority of government to expose 
corruption, punish wrongdoers and defend the rights and interests of American 
workers and investors.”1  As the effects of the current economic downturn 
reverberate throughout the United States and around the world, consumers and 
investors look forward for signs that the crisis has reached its bottom point.  
Identifying the factors that contributed to the crisis is of similar importance 
because then policymakers can take steps to mitigate the risk of recurrence and 
identify whether market participants were exposed to disproportionate risk. 
The burst of the housing bubble and the rapid decline in the value of 
mortgage-backed securities have been identified as a trigger of the current 
economic crisis.2  Economic indicators in the mortgage industry have declined 
tremendously from the record number of homes that have entered foreclosure,3 
investment banks have recorded staggering losses and reduced their 
workforces in response to the decline,4 and home prices have declined 
nationwide.5  However, the impact of the mortgage meltdown extends beyond 
the mortgage industry.  By January 2009, over 2.5 million people lost their 
 
 1. MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: COSTS, BENEFITS AND BUSINESS 
IMPACT 5 (2008). 
 2. See discussion infra Part III. 
 3. See Vikas Bajaj, Foreclosures Rose as Delinquencies Eased in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2008, at B8 (showing that in June 2008, 2.75 percent or approximately 1.75 million 
homes were in foreclosure, the highest rate recorded since such data began being recorded in 
1979). 
 4. See Press Release, Citigroup Inc, Citi Reports Third Quarter Net Loss of $2.8 Billion, 
Loss Per Share of $0.60,  (Oct. 16, 2008), available at www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2008/ 
081016a.htm (explaining Citigroup recognized a loss of $2.8 billion for the 3rd quarter of 2008 
and reduced its head count by 23,000 during the first nine months of 2008). 
 5. See Michael M. Grynbaum, House Sales Rise, But the Prices Are Lower, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/business/26econ.html 
(explaining that in July 2008 home prices fell 7.1% from July 2007.  Though the number of 
homes sold in July 2008 increased, the increase was the result of depressed prices triggered by 
foreclosures and owners forced to sell at bargain prices because of the lack of selling 
opportunities (i.e. “distress sales”), the sales contributed to continued declining home prices). 
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jobs across various industries since the United States entered a recession in 
2007.6  As a result of this job-loss, the lives of many Americans and people 
across the world have been affected.7 
The billions of dollars in financial statement write-downs taken by 
investment banks and the resulting investor shock and market decline conjure 
memories of the corporate scandals and economic downturn the United States 
faced at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  These scandals motivated 
President Bush to sign the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) into law.8  
SOX was intended to improve investor confidence in the market by increasing 
the quality of disclosures made to investors and enhancing management’s 
responsibility for financial statements.9  SOX has remained exceedingly 
controversial due to the staggering costs it places on businesses subject to the 
regulation.10 
Subprime lending by investment banks contributed to the mortgage 
meltdown that has sent the economy into a downward spiral.11  The question 
arises whether there was an opportunity for SOX to mitigate the risk posed by 
the mortgage-related activities of investment banks or whether the events 
precipitating the current crisis were beyond the scope of SOX.  This paper will 
first explore the events that motivated the passage of SOX, Enron’s activities 
leading to its collapse in 2001, and the resulting reforms SOX instituted.  The 
current economic crisis will be investigated next, and finally the role of SOX 
and investment banks within the mortgage crisis will be considered. 
This paper finds SOX was applicable to the investment bank’s financial 
reporting of its mortgage-related activities.  The financial statement accounts 
reflecting the investment bank’s mortgage-related activity should have been 
identified as “significant,” triggering extensive SOX requirements concerning 
management’s responsibility for establishing and assessing internal controls to 
address valuation and disclosure in financial statements. 
II.  INVESTOR OUTRAGE RESULTS IN SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
Several factors led to the rapid and overwhelming congressional support of 
SOX in 2002.  President Bush referred to SOX as “the most far-reaching 
 
 6. Jack Healy, 62,000 Jobs Are Cut by U.S. and Foreign Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/business/economy/27jobcuts.html. 
 7. See Matthew Saltmarsh, Britain and Spain Show More Signs of a Slowdown, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at B2 (stating that in January 2009, Britain entered into recession, and 
Spain had its highest unemployment rate in more than 8 years). 
 8. See discussion infra Part II. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 10. Large multinational companies can spend between $1 and $10 million and smaller 
companies can spend between $250,000 and $500,000 for SOX compliance.  HOLT, supra note 1, 
at 13. 
 11. See discussion infra Part III. 
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reform of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.”12  SOX was preceded by a stock market tumble that began in 2001.  
Prior to this decline, investor confidence followed the market’s consistent 
upward trend.13  As various corporate scandals became public,14 and both the 
dot-com and telecom “bubbles” burst, market and investor confidence sharply 
declined in 2001.15  As 2001 closed, the three major U.S. indices had each lost 
significant value for the year as the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined 7.1 
percent, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index lost 13 percent, and the Nasdaq 
Composite fell 21.1 percent.16  This resulted in a congressional “regulatory 
panic”17 aimed at restoring the very low investor confidence triggered by 
corporate scandals and the declining stock market.18 
A. Corporate Scandals and Dot-Com and Telecom Bubbles Burst 
Prior to the passage of SOX, corporate scandals adversely affected the 
stock market and battered investors as corporations restated earnings and 
wrote-down assets in stunning amounts.19  The scandals that preceded SOX 
included Enron, which took a $500 million accounting loss, reduced 
shareholder equity by $1.2 billion as the result of off-balance sheet debt, and 
ultimately declared bankruptcy in 2001.20  WorldCom also announced in 2002 
it had overstated earnings by $3.8 billion through improperly capitalized 
expenses and recognized $3 billion of revenue it should have expensed.21 
Concurrent with the fallout from Enron, the dot-com bubble burst after the 
tremendous growth of internet-based businesses in the 1980s and 1990s 
spurred by venture capital firms.22  Most of these dot-com companies 
ultimately went out of business in what became an intensely competitive 
 
 12. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT 
WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 9 (2006). 
 13. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2003) (describing the corporate governance issues that came to light from November 
2001 through November 2002). 
 14. SANJAY ANAND, ESSENTIALS OF SARBANES-OXLEY 3–5 (2007). 
 15. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 7–8. 
 16. Floyd Norris, The Markets: Stocks and Bonds; After Two-Year Drop in Markets, 
Calendar Turns on Note of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at A1, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2002/01/01/business/markets-stocks-bonds-after-two-year-drop-markets-calendar-
turns-note-hope.html?scp=1&sq=Drop+in+Markets&st=nyt. 
 17. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7. 
 18. Id. at 30. 
 19. See Thomas G. Bost, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Summary, 7 PERSP. ON LEGIS., 
REG., & LITIG. 1, 2–4 (2003). 
 20. Hamilton, supra note13, at 10–11. 
 21. Id. at 21. 
 22. Id. at 13. 
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market.23  The telecommunications industry also grew rapidly during the 
1990s, as companies installed fiber-optic networks for what was expected to be 
tremendous growth in electronic communication.24  The telecom bubble burst 
as demand failed to keep pace with the tremendous capacity created, causing 
investment interests to dry up, billions of dollars to be lost and many 
companies to restate earnings.25 
As these circumstances drove both market and investor confidence down, 
Congress was motivated to quickly pass the sweeping regulations known as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  In April 2002, several months after Enron’s 
bankruptcy,26 Congressman Michael Oxley introduced the Corporate and 
Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act while Senator 
Paul Sarbanes introduced Senate Bill 2673.27  Because Congressman Oxley’s 
proposed Act was “more moderate,” Senator Sarbanes’ more expansive 
proposal gained support as WorldCom announced its first earnings restatement 
of $3.85 billion.28  What started as two proposals in April 2002 was passed 
though the House of Representatives with a vote of 423 in favor versus three 
opposed, and was unanimously approved by the Senate.  President Bush signed 
Sarbanes-Oxley into law on July 30, 2002.29 
Corporate fraud triggered outrage by the public, investors, and regulators, 
and ultimately resulted in resounding support for the passage of SOX.  The 
overwhelming support was also the result of Congress’ belief that serious 
economic consequences could result if investor confidence was not 
improved.30  The concern loomed that, as investor trust in the market and 
publically traded companies declined, investors would become less willing to 
invest in the U.S. markets, resulting in heightened risks of market seizure and 
potential recession.31  It was in this panicked environment that SOX became 
law. 
B. Enron Debacle Provides Reference Point for Analyzing the Mortgage 
Meltdown 
Enron has emerged as an infamous example of the accounting and 
financial scandals that marked the tumultuous economic downturn in the early 
part of the twenty-first century.  A review of the events leading to Enron’s 
 
 23. Id. at 14. 
 24. Id. at 13–14. 
 25. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 16–17. 
 26. GREGORY J. JENKINS, THE ENRON COLLAPSE 8 (2003). 
 27. ANAND, supra note 14, at 9–10. 
 28. Bost, supra note 19, at 5. 
 29. ANAND, supra note 14, at 10. 
 30. Id. at 5. 
 31. Id. 
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collapse facilitates understanding the aim of SOX and provides a reference 
point for analyzing the current market downturn and investor outrage. 
Enron began operating in 1985 with an initial focus on the transportation 
of natural gas.32  As Enron spent billions of dollars to expand worldwide, it 
shifted from merely operating a gas utility toward activity in the unregulated 
energy trading markets.33  Enron predicted this trading activity would be more 
profitable than engaging in a more traditional business model and owning 
physical assets.34  Before becoming the quintessential example of corporate 
governance failure, Enron’s business methods appeared to be successful.  It 
became the seventh largest company in the United States35 and was repeatedly 
ranked by Fortune as the most innovative company in America.36  The 
company went from reporting revenues of approximately $9 billion dollars in 
1995 to $101 billion in 2000, and the stock price grew from approximately $20 
in 1997 to almost $90 in 2000.37  However, the basis for its stock price was 
unfounded.  Inflated asset values and understated liabilities drove its stock 
price up, while, in reality, the company was moving toward bankruptcy.38  
Enron was holding $1.2 billion in recourse debt that was invisible to investors 
because it was not consolidated onto Enron’s balance sheet and was otherwise 
undisclosed in the financial statements.39 
One significant tactic Enron used to mislead investors was its aggressive 
and deceptive use of special purpose entities (“SPEs”).40  An SPE allows a 
company to create a “separate, independently controlled entity, with a portion 
of the ownership separate from the main company’s ownership,” resulting in 
the risk exposure of the SPE being carried separate from the main company.41  
When properly structured, an SPE allows a company to pursue potentially 
risky projects without requiring the main company to consolidate the SPE onto 
the balance sheet of the main company.42 
 
 32. Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 3, 11 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (activities included “buying and selling financial contracts linked to the value of 
energy assets.”). 
 35. ANAND, supra note 14, at 4. 
 36. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 8. 
 37. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 4–5. 
 38. Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Business Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON, CORPORATE 
FIASCOS, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 63, 64 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
 39. Id. at 66. 
 40. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 13–14 (explaining how these accounting practices 
themselves are commonly used and their deceptive potential comes from how businesses choose 
to utilize them). 
 41. Id. at 14. 
 42. Id. 
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Enron’s accounting treatment of its SPEs was improper because, while it 
did not consolidate its SPEs onto its balance sheet, Enron failed to qualify for 
this preferential accounting treatment.  Many of Enron’s SPEs did not maintain 
the requisite 3% of independent ownership, and Enron was exposed to 
substantial risk from the SPE’s operations because Enron made guarantees 
related to the SPE’s obligations.43  As a result, although Enron should have 
consolidated the associated debt onto its consolidated balance sheet,44 it failed 
to do so.45  Enron announced on October 16, 2001 that in order to revise its 
accounting for SPEs, it was taking a half a billion-dollar charge against its 
earnings and reducing its equity by $1.2 billion.46  Less than two weeks 
following Enron’s earnings announcement, its stock declined in value by more 
than 54%.47  Enron also announced that it would have to make astronomical 
restatements of its earnings and significantly increase its consolidated debt 
from 1997 through the first two quarters of 2001 because of previously 
unconsolidated entities.48  Prior to Enron, Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (“GAAP”) required disclosures concerning related-party 
transactions, but Enron failed to disclose to investors in sufficient detail the 
structure of its SPEs.49  This left investors in the dark on Enron’s risk exposure 
until the SPE deals soured and triggered Enron’s responsibility for the SPE’s 
obligations.50  Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.51 
There was an even more startling aspect of the Enron saga beyond the 
extent of fraud perpetrated.  Enron’s Board of Directors owed a fiduciary duty 
to Enron’s shareholders.52  Enron’s lawyers owed a duty to the corporation.53  
Enron’s public accountants owed a duty to the public.54  All failed to either 
detect the fraud or blow the whistle.55  As discussed below, SOX attempted to 
respond to the triggers of the financial debacles of the time, including Enron. 
 
 43. Id. (stating that in many cases Enron’s Chief Financial Officer controlled the 
partnerships comprising the 3% of independent ownership). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 14. 
 46. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7. 
 47. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 7. 
 48. Reductions to net income were equivalent to “reductions in reported earnings of 91% in 
1997, 16% in 1998, 28% in 1999 and 13% in 2000.”  Id. at 7–8. 
 49. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 15. 
 50. Bethany McLean, Enron All Over Again, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at 76, available at 
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/11/26/101232905/index.htm. 
 51. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 8. 
 52. Janger, supra note 38, at 66. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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C. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Provisions 
The self-proclaimed purpose of SOX is “[t]o protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures.”56  SOX 
attempted to establish comprehensive reform measures by establishing the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), addressed auditor 
independence, corporate responsibility, and enhanced financial disclosures.57  
SOX is applicable to companies that are registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and it amended several established laws and also 
established new regulations.58 
SOX established the PCAOB to vest an organization with responsibility to 
oversee the audit of public companies, protect investors and address the 
preparation of audit reports.59  The PCAOB’s authority includes setting quality 
control and independence standards,60 conducting compliance inspections of 
registered public accounting firms,61 and pronouncing audit standards.62  The 
creation of the PCAOB subjected the previously self-regulated public 
accounting industry to an independent regulatory body.63  SOX attempted to 
increase auditor independence from the client by mandating audit partner 
rotation64 and requiring periodic reports by the auditor to the audit committee 
of the company’s board of directors.65  Auditor independence was further 
 
 56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 57. § 1, 116 Stat. at 745–46.  Other areas addressed by SOX include restrictions based on 
analyst conflicts of interest, mandating the conduction of various studies and reports, and 
addressing penalties for corporate and criminal fraud. 
 58. GUY LANDER, WHAT IS SARBANES OXLEY? 1–2 (2004). 
 59. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 750.  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board states the 
following as its mission: “The PCAOB is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation, created by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to oversee the auditors of public companies in order to protect the 
interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair, and 
independent audit reports.”  Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Oversees the Auditors 
of Public Companies to Protect Investors, http://pcaob.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 60. § 103, 116 Stat. 745, 755–57. 
 61. § 104, 116 Stat. at 757–59. 
 62. § 103, 116 Stat. at 755–57.  For example, the PCAOB pronounced Auditing Standard 
No. 5 – An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with An Audit 
of Financial Statements.  PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., BYLAWS AND RULES OF THE 
PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD 434 (2010), available at http://pcaobus.org/ 
Rules/PCAOBRules/Documents/All.pdf. 
 63. See JENKINS, supra note 26, at 18.  SOX made it unlawful for any person who is not 
registered with the PCAOB to issue an audit report for an issuer.  § 102, 116 Stat. at 753. 
 64. § 203, 116 Stat. at 773. 
 65. § 204, 116 Stat. at 773. 
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addressed by specifying non-audit services that a registered public accounting 
firm is prohibited from providing to audit clients.66 
SOX also addressed the role of the audit committee by stipulating that the 
committee is “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and 
oversight of the work” of the company’s auditor.67  The company’s audit 
committee members are to be independent of the company, and the only 
compensation members may receive is based on participation on the audit 
committee.68  This committee is also vested with the responsibility for 
establishing procedures to receive and address complaints concerning the 
company’s accounting, internal control, and auditing activities.69  The audit 
committee is also empowered to hire independent counsel and advisors as 
necessary to assist in carrying out its responsibilities.70 
SOX attempted to increase management’s responsibility for financial 
statements and how information consolidated into financial statements is 
identified and reported.  Both the “principal” executive and financial officers 
are required to make certifications concerning how the company’s condition is 
presented in the annual and quarterly reports.71  Both officers are required to 
attest to reviewing the annual or quarterly report, that “based on the officer’s 
knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of material fact or 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not 
misleading,” and that the reports “fairly present in all material respects the 
financial condition and results of operations . . . .”72  Requiring the officer’s 
certification (based upon the officer’s knowledge) holds both officers 
personally responsible for the annual and quarterly reports to prevent 
delegation of responsibility for financial statements.73 
The “principal” executive and financial officers are also charged with 
responsibility concerning the company’s internal control environment.  Each 
annual and quarterly report must include an acknowledgement by the 
“principal” executive and financial officers’ of their responsibility for 
designing controls to ensure that the company’s material information is known 
to the officers.74  Management is also required to make an assessment of the 
 
 66. § 201, 116 Stat. at 771–72.  Prohibited non-audit services include bookkeeping, 
“financial information systems design and implementation,” appraisals, actuarial services, 
internal audit, management or human resources, investment advisor, legal services and other 
services found by the Board of Directors to be impermissible. 
 67. § 301, 116 Stat. at 777. 
 68. § 301, 116 Stat. at 776. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Bost, supra note 19, at 32. 
 74. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777. 
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internal controls and include a report on the assessment in the company’s 
annual and quarterly reports.75  The report includes management’s statement of 
responsibility to establish and maintain “an adequate internal control structure 
and procedures for financial reporting” and an assessment of the “effectiveness 
of the internal control structure and procedures” for financial reporting.76  SOX 
also requires these officers to report to both the auditor and audit committee all 
significant internal control deficiencies that could adversely affect the 
company’s ability to report financial data and detect management fraud.77 
The criminal penalties for failure to comply with SOX indicate the 
seriousness of Congress’ message in passing SOX.  Penalties for a certified 
report’s failure to comply with SOX can include 10 years imprisonment, fines 
of up to $1 million, or both.78  A certifying officer who willfully certifies a 
statement knowing the statement does not comply with SOX can be penalized 
with up to 20 years imprisonment, fines of up to $5 million, or both.79 
SOX attempted to improve financial statement disclosures by several 
mechanisms.  SOX requires disclosure of material “off-balance sheet 
transactions, arrangements, and obligations” and other relationships with 
unconsolidated entities or persons that may have a “material current or future 
effect” on the company’s financial condition.80  SOX also requires that pro 
forma financial information be presented free from untrue material facts and 
free from omissions of material facts necessary to ensure the pro forma data 
are not misleading.81  SOX also enhanced the role of the auditor by explicitly 
requiring the financial statements to reflect “all material correcting 
adjustments” identified by the external auditor.82 
SOX furthermore addressed disclosures concerning the company’s 
corporate governance structure.  A company must disclose whether it has 
adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers and, if not, must explain 
why no such code has been adopted.83  Finally, a company is directed to 
disclose whether the audit committee includes at least one member who is a 
“financial expert” and, if not, explain the reason for the absence.84 
 
 75. § 404, 116 Stat. at 789. 
 76. Id.  SOX increases the spotlight placed on internal controls and information publically 
available by also requiring the external auditor to express an opinion on management’s 
assessment of the company’s internal controls.  Id. 
 77. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777. 
 78. § 906, 116 Stat. at 806. 
 79. Id. 
 80. § 401, 116 Stat. at 785–87. 
 81. § 401, 116 Stat. at 786. 
 82. Id. 
 83. § 406, 116 Stat. at 789. 
 84. § 407, 116 Stat. at 790.  In determining whether one is a “financial expert,” factors 
considered include education and work experience (including roles such as public accountant, 
auditor and principal financial officer), an understanding of generally accepted accounting 
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The overriding goals of SOX include improving information provided to 
investors by enhancing the integrity, accuracy, and accountability of financial 
statements.85  These goals are aimed at improving and maintaining the trust of 
investors by increasing the standards in both a moral and professional 
capacity.86  The integrity and accuracy of financial statements are addressed in 
SOX through its requirements concerning the establishment, maintenance and 
assessment of a company’s internal control structure.87  The integrity of 
financial statements is to be improved by installing internal control 
requirements geared to ensure all relevant financial information is presented, 
while stripping the financial statements of fraudulent reporting.88  The 
accuracy of financial statements is to be improved by imposing an internal 
control system that is capable of preventing and detecting misleading business 
practices.89  These provisions can be linked to Enron’s financial statements, 
which lacked integrity and accuracy since they did not adequately disclose the 
nature of its relationship with SPEs and failed to consolidate SPE debt onto its 
balance sheet.90  Enron’s use of pro form reports also contributed to its 
misrepresentation by characterizing various billion dollar charges as “non-
recurring,” allowing it to present pro forma financial data as if the charges had 
not been incurred.91  Investigations into Enron’s corporate governance system 
identified weakness or absence of internal controls as a source of its failure.92 
SOX attempted to improve the accountability of corporate executives for 
financial statements by removing the “faceless corporation” as a refuge for 
inadequate financial reporting.93  SOX expressly communicates, to both the 
company and the public, which executives are responsible for information 
presented in financial statements.94  With Enron, there was not a single 
individual or a group who could officially be designated as responsible for 
assuring implementation of internal controls over financial reporting.95  SOX 
addressed this opportunity for blame shifting by requiring a specific person be 
identified who is accountable for shortcomings of the financial statements. 
 
principles and financial statements, experience in preparing or auditing financial statements, 
experience with accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves, internal controls experience and 
an understanding of the audit committee functions. 
 85. ANAND, supra note 14, at 28. 
 86. Id. at 23. 
 87. Id. at 29. 
 88. See id. at 23–24. 
 89. Id. at 24–25. 
 90. Janger, supra note 38, at 66. 
 91. See Van Niel, supra note 32, at 15. 
 92. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 18. 
 93. ANAND, supra note 14, at 24–25. 
 94. Id. 
 95. JENKINS, supra note 26, at 19. 
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SOX provisions changed the requirements for corporate governance.  The 
responsibilities of executive officers, the board of directors, and accounting 
firms were revised and enhanced.96  Commentators have questioned whether 
SOX was the best response to prevent the repetition of the corporate fraud that 
plagued the beginning of the twenty-first century.97  The current economic 
crisis and the role of the investment banks within the crisis provide an 
opportunity to assess whether SOX was an effective response. 
III.  SUBPRIME LENDING LEADS TO ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Many factors have contributed to the recession the United States entered in 
December 2007.  Since entering the recession, the United States has sustained 
a staggering amount of job losses,98 the stock market has wildly fluctuated and 
lost value,99 a substantial number of mortgages have gone into foreclosure,100 
and investment banks have taken billions of dollars in losses.101  Though the 
understanding of the causes underlying the economic downturn continues to be 
refined, it is clear that losses on mortgages and mortgage-backed securities 
played a pivotal role in the credit crisis that has exacerbated the situation.102  
The following discussion of the role of mortgage-related activities in the 
economic downturn introduces the evolution of the complex mortgage 
industry, the events which precipitated the current mortgage meltdown, and 
how the housing decline triggered substantial investment bank losses. 
A. Evolution of the Complex Mortgage Industry 
The mortgage industry has evolved into a very complex market that 
ultimately contributed to the difficulty of assessing the risk of mortgage-
backed securities.  Traditionally, the issuance of a home mortgage was a 
transaction that occurred primarily between the borrower and a local lender 
who recorded the loan on the lender’s books.103  The industry began to grow 
more complex during the 1970s, when government-sponsored entities began 
 
 96. LANDER, supra note 58, at 1. 
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purchasing mortgages from local lenders, removing the loans from the lenders’ 
books and clustering them into “mortgage-backed securities.”104  The arrival of 
mortgage-backed securities resulted in a fundamental shift in the operation of 
the mortgage market because the local lender no longer bore the risk of 
mortgage default as the lender shifted the default risk to the holders of 
mortgage-backed securities.105 
The variety of mortgage products available has also evolved over time, 
becoming more complex, and making it more difficult to predict the risk of 
borrower default.106  The two primary kinds of mortgages are a fixed-rate 
mortgage (“FRM”) and adjustable-rate mortgage (“ARM”).107  The interest 
rate and payment amount of a FRM are fixed and do not fluctuate over time.108  
In contrast, the interest rate and payments of an ARM vary and can fluctuate 
greatly because payment is determined by reference to an index.109 
Subprime borrowers are individuals with “a high debt-to-income ratio, an 
impaired or minimal credit history,” or have other characteristics suggesting a 
higher probability of default than a prime borrower.110  Subprime mortgages 
are typically offered an interest rate higher than a prime mortgage rate.111  
Many subprime mortgages begin with a starter rate that resets after twenty-four 
or thirty-six months.112  Once the subprime mortgage’s low initial fixed rate 
expires, the rate becomes variable and monthly payments are likely to 
increase.113 
B. Popularity of Subprime Lending Increases Due to Reduced Interest Rates 
and Securitization of Mortgages 
The subprime lending market has operated since the early 1980s but 
experienced an increased rate of growth during the mid-1990s and grew 
exponentially during the early part of the twenty-first century.114  For example, 
$120 billion of subprime loans were originated during 2001, while over $600 
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billion in subprime loans were originated during 2006.115  This growth was 
spurred by several factors, including the reduction of interest rates during 2001 
and 2002 and mortgage securitization.116 
1. Reduced Interest Rates Lead to Increased Subprime Lending 
The market decline in 2001 and 2002 triggered the significant reduction in 
interest rates and resulted in the prime mortgage market becoming highly 
saturated.117  As a result of the market saturation, lenders sought to issue more 
mortgages and turned to riskier subprime borrowers.118  Lenders were 
motivated to continue issuing mortgages by the opportunities to generate 
profits through mortgage securitization.119  The growth in the subprime market 
was further enhanced by the questionable underwriting practices of some 
lenders.  Such practices included issuing mortgages based solely on the 
borrower’s stated income, requiring little or no documentation.120  Some 
lenders offered hybrid mortgages and approved borrowers based on their 
ability to pay the minimum mortgage payments, without consideration of the 
borrower’s ability to pay the higher payments required once the mortgage 
transitioned into an ARM.121  The liquidity available to lenders through the 
securitization process provided an incentive for lenders to issue riskier 
mortgages without the tempering effect of the lender bearing the risk of 
default.122 
2. Mortgage Securitization Further Increases the Popularity of Subprime 
Lending 
The mechanisms and parties involved with securitizing mortgages are 
complex, and as such, the following is intended to present an overview of the 
process to assist in understanding the current crisis and role of investment 
banks.  The securitization process begins with the lender issuing a loan to a 
borrower.  In many cases, the lender will then sell its rights to collect the 
mortgage payments to a trust or special purpose entity (SPE)123 that the lender 
has created.124  The SPE effectively becomes the owner of the loans and 
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underwrites the mortgage-backed securities.125  Mortgage-backed securities are 
created by grouping subprime mortgages and other assets together and then 
dividing the group into sections, or “tranches,” based upon the likelihood of 
default.126  After the securities have been underwritten, either the underwriter 
or an investment bank purchases the securities from the trust and then conveys 
the securities to investors.127 
Repurchase agreements are one source of bankruptcy risk for lenders.  
Lenders often enter into repurchase agreements with the mortgage purchasers, 
stipulating that the lender will repurchase the subprime loans if default rates of 
the underlying loans reach a specified threshold.128  Lenders are to fund 
reserves to service these potential repurchases.129  Bankruptcy can result when 
lenders do not properly reserve for their repurchase requirements.130 
The securitization of subprime loans significantly increased in 2003.  
Investment banks were the catalyst for the growth of subprime mortgages as 
they purchased and securitized tremendous numbers of loans.131  In 2006, the 
top ten investment banks sold mortgage-backed securities worth $1.5 trillion, a 
dramatic increase from the $245 billion of mortgage-backed securities sold in 
2000.132  Investment banks further increased their participation by purchasing 
mortgage wholesaling firms, extending billions of dollars in credit to subprime 
lenders, and even purchasing subprime lenders.133 
Mortgage securitization was considered a risk reducing activity because 
the risk of default would be widely spread across many investors.134  However, 
as banks also created more complex mortgages and new, increasingly complex 
securities, it became more difficult for investors to assess the risk of default for 
the underlying assets.135  Meanwhile, the potentially crippling economic 
impact that could result from the widespread default of subprime mortgages 
was compounded by several other factors.  Financial institutions used 
mortgage-backed securities as collateral to borrow more money, which further 
extended the reach of subprime mortgage-backed securities into the 
economy.136  Additionally, beginning in 2004, the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission permitted investment banks to carry $30 in debt for each $1 in 
equity.137  This degree of leverage became unmanageable when the market was 
no longer willing to buy the mortgage-backed securities that provided the 
collateral for the debt.138 
The purchasers of mortgage-backed securities further extended the risk 
underlying subprime mortgages into the greater economy as investors in 
mortgage-backed securities came to include “individuals, hedge funds and 
companies.”139  The extension of this risk to the greater economy had rippling 
effects that extended beyond defaulting homeowners and purchasers of 
mortgage-backed securities, and ultimately triggered significant losses for 
investment banks and the loss of jobs in many industries. 
C. The Housing Decline Triggers Investment Bank Losses 
Though the housing bubble led to tremendous opportunities for subprime 
borrowers to achieve home ownership, the bubble’s burst had staggering 
effects on those same subprime borrowers and ultimately the economy at large.  
Home values consistently increased until 2006, when prices began to fall.140  
During the period of soaring home values (and increasing subprime lending), 
borrowers facing an ARM resetting to a higher payment could avoid 
delinquency by either refinancing their mortgage or selling their house.141  
When the housing market turned, subprime borrowers facing adjusting ARM 
payments found that home values were falling and existing home sales were 
declining.142  Those who were unable to refinance their mortgage or sell their 
home were left with little alternative to default.143  These defaults negatively 
impacted investors in mortgage-backed securities as the securities lost value in 
response to increasing defaults.144 
Mortgage loan deficiencies approached 10-year highs in 2007, and for the 
first time since the Great Depression, median home prices declined across the 
nation.145  Once losses in subprime mortgage-backed securities started to 
occur, investors retracted from mortgage-backed securities and other types of 
complex securitized products, including investments that had traditionally been 
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considered safe, such as asset-backed commercial paper.146  The availability of 
credit was severely curtailed and offered only to those with the highest of 
credit ratings.147  The impact of this credit crunch extended to everyday 
businesses struggling to finance their operations in an environment of reduced 
credit.148  Businesses could no longer rely on credit to bridge the timing 
differences between receiving payments and incurring the costs necessary to 
operate.149 
Investment banks struggled to survive after sustaining hundreds of billions 
of dollars in losses from mortgage-related activities during 2008.150  
Unprecedented events for many investment companies occurred during 
September 2008, including companies that had previously seemed impervious 
to trouble.  For example, Lehman Brothers was unable to continue treading 
water and ultimately filed for bankruptcy, and Bank of America purchased 
Merrill Lynch for $50 billion.151  The economic hardship was not confined to 
investment banks as the overall economy suffered staggering job losses in 
2008, a trend that continued into 2009.  For example, November 2008 saw the 
loss of over five hundred thousand jobs, and over sixty-five thousand jobs were 
lost on a single day: January 26, 2009.152 
In light of the severity of the economic downturn, the question arises 
whether SOX, the controversial legislative response to the last bout of 
corporate scandal, functioned adequately to protect investors and the public.  
Were the tremendous costs incurred by companies to be in compliance with 
SOX in vain, or did SOX minimize the losses the investment banks 
incurred?153 
III.  THE ROLE OF SOX AND INVESTMENT BANKS IN THE MORTGAGE CRISIS 
SOX focused on the creation of financial statements free from material 
misstatement, increased management’s responsibility for financial statements, 
and implemented internal controls related to financial reporting.  The following 
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discussion considers the application of SOX to investment banks in the events 
leading to the economic downturn.  This section will consider whether 
investment banks appropriately identified mortgage-related accounts as 
requiring internal controls for financial reporting, whether the mortgage-related 
accounts were properly valued in the financial statements, and whether the 
financial statement disclosures regarding investment bank’s mortgage-related 
activity complied with the SOX mandated disclosures.154 
The massive asset write-downs taken by investment banks since 2007 
demonstrate that mortgage-related activity had the potential to greatly impact 
financial statements.155  As part of the focus on financial reporting and 
auditing, SOX requires that both management and the company’s external 
auditor assess the company’s internal controls over financial reporting.156  
SOX also charged the PCAOB with responsibility for promulgating standards 
for the audit of financial statements.157  Thus, the PCAOB pronouncement 
addressing the audit of internal controls over financial reporting provides 
valuable insight into what SOX intended for management to consider when 
establishing and assessing its internal control over financial reporting.158  The 
current PCAOB pronouncement for the audit of internal controls over financial 
reporting is Auditing Standard No. 5 (“AS 5”) and will be used here to help 
identify areas where SOX may have been applicable and therefore play a role 
in the financial reporting of investment banks leading up to the mortgage 
meltdown.159 
The requirement for management to assess its internal controls is provided 
for in SOX to afford “reasonable assurance” of the “reliability of financial 
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reporting and preparation of financial statements.”160  AS 5 indicates the 
assessment should address the internal controls that concern accounts and 
disclosures that are “significant.”161  Thus, the internal controls of the accounts 
and disclosures considered “significant” to the investment bank should have 
been assessed by both management and the company’s external auditor.  AS 5 
also sets out financial statement “assertions” that should be considered when 
identifying significant accounts and disclosures.162  The most applicable types 
of assertions relative to the discussion here of the mortgage crisis are 
“valuation” and “presentation and disclosure.”163  The success of SOX in this 
area depends on the identification of the correct “significant” accounts and 
disclosures, implementing proper internal controls to address the financial 
reporting of these accounts and disclosures, and management properly 
assessing the effectiveness of the internal controls.164 
A. Accounts Reflecting Mortgage Activity Trigger the Need for Internal 
Controls 
Auditing Standard No. 5 identifies several factors to consider in identifying 
significant accounts.  These factors include the: 
Size and composition of account; volume of activity; complexity and 
homogeneity of the individual transactions processed through the account; 
nature of the account; accounting and reporting complexities associated with 
the account; exposure to losses in the account; and possibility of significant 
contingent liabilities arising from the activities reflected in the account.165 
Considering these risk factors it seems that the accounts reflecting the 
mortgage activities of investment banks should be deemed “significant,” 
triggering the requirement for internal controls concerning these accounts.  
There was a tremendous volume of subprime lending, as loan originations 
reached approximately $625 billion in 2005.166  There were also a remarkable 
number of mortgage-backed securities transactions by investment banks, 
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evidenced by the $1.5 trillion worth of mortgage-backed securities the top 10 
investment banks sold during 2006.167  The variety of mortgages and 
securitization schemes underlying these accounts also became increasingly 
complex.168  Additionally, the sale of mortgages by investment banks to SPEs 
triggered the application of complicated accounting standards and the need to 
fund reserves for repurchase agreements in order to stave off the risk of 
bankruptcy.169  Further, there was obviously a significant risk of loss 
associated with mortgage-related activities, as hundreds of billions in losses 
have been triggered by these activities.170  These accounts, therefore, likely 
should be been identified as “significant.” 
Since mortgage-related accounts should have been identified “significant,” 
investment banks should have concluded that these accounts required internal 
controls addressing their valuation and disclosure in the financial statements.  
Citigroup will be used as an example to illustrate the potential applications of 
these aspects of SOX to the role of investment banks in the mortgage 
meltdown.171 
B. Internal Control over Valuation 
The “valuation” financial statement assertion addresses whether elements 
of the financial statement have been appraised or “valued” appropriately.172  
Assets recorded in financial statements at fair value have been affected by the 
housing and mortgage markets, triggering the need to increase credit losses for 
mortgage and mortgage-backed securities.173  The internal controls addressing 
the valuation of the accounts that reflect this activity should address the 
method of valuation, whether the method’s underlying assumptions are 
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reasonable, and if the method should be altered due to market conditions.174  
This could be an area of success or failure for SOX, primarily turning on 
whether the internal controls concerning valuation triggered investment banks 
to take their mortgage-related write-downs at the proper time.  If the write-
down of an asset should have been taken earlier than when it was actually 
reflected in the financial statements, it would indicate that the prior financial 
statements were improperly overvalued. 
SOX may not have enhanced investor protection during the mortgage crisis 
if investment banks failed to identify the accounts reflecting mortgage activity 
as “significant” and, thus, failed to conclude the accounts required internal 
controls to address proper valuation.175  If the correct accounts are not 
identified as requiring internal controls to address how the activity is recorded 
in the financial statements, investors are not provided with information 
superior to the information available pre-SOX. 
Sox may not have provided increased investor protection if investment 
banks correctly implemented the internal controls but incorrectly assessed the 
controls as effective.176  For example, one of Citigroup’s write-downs in its 
Securities and Banking division for the fourth quarter of 2008 included $4.6 
billion for direct subprime related exposure.177  In the fourth quarter of 2007, 
Citigroup wrote down $17.4 billion for the same exposure.178  If it is found in 
the future that the 2008 write-down should have occurred in 2007 or sooner, 
then both the 2008 financial statements and the prior period’s financial 
statements would have been improperly valued.  This could be considered an 
area where SOX was not effective if it is found that though management 
conducted the required assessment and determined that the internal controls 
were effective, when in actuality the adjustments should have been recorded in 
a different period.  This would suggest that merely complying with SOX 
assessment requirements was not sufficient to provide additional protection to 
investors.179 
Conversely, SOX may be deemed a success concerning account valuation 
if it is determined that the mortgage-related accounts were properly valued and 
the write-downs that occurred in 2007 and 2008 were taken in the proper 
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period.180  This would constitute a SOX success because proper valuation 
would be indicative of management’s implementation of internal controls that 
facilitated the bank’s identification of the write-downs’ proper timing and 
application of accounting standards.181 
As further investigation into the mortgage crisis is conducted, it will be 
possible to more definitively assess whether the SOX provisions addressing 
internal controls and their application to valuation were successful.  It is, 
however, possible at this time to identify that there were opportunities for the 
application of SOX concerning the valuation of mortgage-related activities. 
C. SOX Disclosure Requirements 
Section 401 though Section 409 of SOX are dedicated to “enhanced 
financial disclosures” and include specific guidelines that address the 
disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions, management’s assessment of 
internal controls, pro forma information, the use of a code of ethics, and the 
presence of a financial expert on the Audit Committee.182  Additionally, via AS 
5, there should be a component of the internal control framework tailored to 
address the disclosures comprising the financial statements and whether they 
are “properly classified, described, and disclosed.”183 
1. Investment Bank’s Use of Off-Balance Sheet Transactions Trigger 
SOX Provisions 
As mentioned in Part III.A.2, an SPE is a type of off-balance sheet 
arrangement that can be used by lenders as part of the mortgage securitization 
process.184  Section 401 requires a company to disclose material “off-balance 
sheet transactions”185 in the Management Discussion and Analysis of the 
annual and quarterly reports.186  The disclosure is intended to provide investors 
with enhanced transparency by including discussion to address the nature of 
the relationship, the importance of the transactions to liquidity, the nature of 
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any interests retained by the company, and any known events of uncertainty 
that are likely to reduce the benefit of the SPE to the company.187 
While it is to be expected that the 2008 annual reports of investment banks 
will include significant disclosures related to the off-balance sheet 
arrangements that contributed to the losses recorded during 2008, one might 
also expect for there to have been similar disclosures prior to the losses that 
were ultimately recorded.  SPE transactions were one of the principal triggers 
of Enron’s downfall, and its investors were not properly or sufficiently 
informed of the degree of risk Enron was exposed to by them.188  The spirit of 
SOX would seem to call for providing investors with disclosure before the 
investor suffers declining share value from losses stemming from these risks. 
Investment banks began writing-down assets related to mortgage activities 
in October 2007.189  This renders the 2006 annual report of an investment bank 
of particular interest to the analysis here.  Comparison of Citigroup’s 2006 and 
2007 annual reports will therefore be used to highlight the application of SOX 
to the mortgage meltdown. 
In 2006, Citigroup allocated two pages of its annual report discussion 
under the heading “Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements.”190  The discussion 
stated that Citigroup was involved with various off-balance sheet arrangements 
that included SPEs, some of which were variable interest entities (“VIEs”) 
requiring financial support from third parties.191  Citigroup stated that it did not 
consolidate most of these VIEs into its financial statements because Citigroup 
was not the primary beneficiary of the VIEs.192  Citigroup did note that some 
of these arrangements concerned the securitization of assets, including 
mortgage loan securitizations, and that those arrangements had previously been 
recorded on its consolidated balance sheet.193  Additionally, Citigroup noted 
that it securitized a wide range of mortgage products to reduce credit exposure 
“effectively transferring the risk of future credit losses to the purchasers of the 
securities issued.”194 
There is also a reference within the off-balance sheet discussion directing 
readers to an additional note for further discussion.  This note included a table 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Van Niel, supra note 32, at 14–15. 
 189. For example, Citigroup announced for the first time in October that its net income would 
decline for the third quarter of 2007 from “dislocations in the mortgage-backed securities and 
credit markets.”  Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Expects Substantial Decline in Third Quarter 
Net Income (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2007/071001a.pdf. 
 190. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 92–93 (Feb. 23, 2007). 
 191. Id. at 92.  Citigroup defines a VIE as “type of SPE that does not have sufficient equity to 
finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support from third parties.” 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  The discussion includes a reference to another footnote for further discussion of cash 
flows received and paid in relation to the securitizations. 
 194. Id. at 93. 
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describing the assets of unconsolidated VIEs and company’s expectation that 
actual losses related to unconsolidated VIEs will not be material, with an 
estimated maximum exposure from unconsolidated VIEs of $109 billion for 
2006.195  Though there was discussion of the company’s estimated maximum 
exposure, arguably investors would have had to search for the information, as 
it was not included in the discussion under the heading “Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangements.”  Readers had to refer to a separate note, and the information 
was presented several pages into the referenced note. 
Citigroup significantly increased the number of pages and discussion under 
the heading “Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements” in 2007.  The pages increased 
to twelve and increased the discussion of Citigroup’s VIE exposures and the 
difficulties surrounding the decision whether to consolidate them in the 
financial statements.196  The expanded discussion included the standard for 
determining whether a VIE is reported on a consolidated basis in the financial 
statements, “based on expected loss and residual returns” from those scenarios 
most likely to occur.197  Citigroup commented on the difficulty in ascertaining 
whether the extent of its involvement with the VIEs rendered it a primary 
beneficiary (based on “significant involvement”) and the factors to consider in 
making the assessment.198 
Citigroup made a significant adjustment in its disclosure in 2007 by 
altering its definition of “significant involvement” to include all variable 
interests, including those interests where the likelihood of loss was considered 
small.199  This triggered VIEs previously considered insignificant to be 
reclassified to significant.200  Citigroup’s rationale for the expanded 
designation of significant VIEs was to provide “more meaningful and 
consistent information regarding its involvement in various VIE structures 
and . . . more data for an independent assessment of the potential risks the 
Company’s involvement in various VIEs and asset classes.”201 
This reclassification had a tremendous impact of the 2006 unconsolidated 
“significant” VIEs, which increased from $227.8 billion in 2006202 to $388.3 
billion when reclassified in 2007.203  Another potential source of surprise for 
investors in 2007 was the $58.5 billion dollars of additional liability reported 
on the consolidated balance sheet in 2007 after Citigroup became the primary 
 
 195. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 147 (Feb. 23, 2007). 
 196. See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 85–96 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 197. Id. at 85. 
 198. Id. at 85–86. 
 199. Id. at 86. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 86 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 202. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 147 (Feb. 23, 2007). 
 203. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 87 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
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beneficiary of its structured investment vehicles (SIVs), a type of SPE.204  The 
only specific reference to SIVs in Citigroup’s 2006 Annual Report was 
embedded as a line item within a table presenting SPE assets and was not 
included under the heading “Off Balance Sheet Arrangements”.205 
As SOX specifically addressed off-balance sheet relationships in its 
provisions, it certainly had a role to play in the period leading up to the current 
economic turmoil because much of the losses sustained by the investment 
banks were triggered by off-balance sheet relationships.206  Whether the 
disclosures concerning the investment bank’s off-balance sheet arrangements 
were SOX compliant will likely be addressed in the future through shareholder 
litigation. 
Presumably, investment bank investors should have been in a better 
position than Enron investors to assess the risk posed by off-balance sheet 
arrangements since SOX attempted to enhance these disclosures in response to 
the outrage of Enron’s investors to its hidden off-balance sheet risk 
exposure.207  However, similar to the shock felt by Enron investors when the 
risks of its off-balance sheet relationships were revealed, investors of 
investment banks are currently expressing shock at the magnitude of risk 
investment banks undertook and ultimately passed on to its investors.208  With 
Enron, the disclosure of the extent of its risky off-balance sheet relationships 
was revealed after the damage to the company had already been inflicted.209  
Here, while there was increased disclosure in 2007 preceding the tremendous 
write-downs during 2008, there was minimal disclosure of off-balance sheet 
risk exposure prior to the write-downs taken during 2007.  This may be found 
to have denied investors the opportunity to adequately assess the risk 
investment banks faced from off-balance sheet arrangements and, thus, could 
be considered a failure of SOX. 
If the disclosures are found to be lacking, this may also indicate a failure of 
the internal controls intended to address the adequacy of financial statement 
disclosures.  Future investigations will likely shed further light on whether the 
investment banks’ disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements was 
inadequate, whether investors gave inadequate attention to the disclosures that 
were presented, or a combination of both. 
 
 204. Id. at 94. In 2007 Citigroup became a primary beneficiary of structured investment 
vehicles, by committing to support the SIVs senior debt rating.  The rating of the debt had been 
downgraded and continued liquidity issues prompted Citigroup to make the commitment, 
resulting in consolidation of the SIV on Citigroup’s balance sheet. 
 205. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 146 (Feb. 23, 2007). 
 206. McLean, supra note 50, at 76. 
 207. See supra Part II.B. 
 208. See supra Part II.B. 
 209. See supra Part II.B. 
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2. Investment Bank’s Use of Pro Forma Data Regarding Capital 
Requirements Trigger SOX Provisions 
SOX also addressed the presentation of disclosures related to pro forma 
data.  Section 401 calls for pro forma data to be presented in a manner that is 
free from untrue material facts and free from omissions of material facts 
necessary to make the pro forma data not misleading.210  While in 2006, 
Citigroup did not present pro forma mortgage-related data,211 its 2007 Annual 
Report presented pro forma capital ratios incorporating the effect of 
Citigroup’s actions to increase its capital base during the fourth quarter of 2007 
and beginning of 2008.212  SOX calls for assessing whether this presentation of 
pro forma capital ratios was free from untrue material facts and whether any 
material facts necessary to make them not misleading were omitted when 
Citigroup indicated that the pro forma capital ratios would have exceeded 
management’s targets.213  The discussion presented did not directly discuss any 
perceived concerns about future needs to further increase Citigroup’s capital 
base.214 
The absence of discussion of future capital needs may be considered a 
violation of SOX if the absence constituted a failure to include material facts 
necessary to prevent the data from being misleading.  This is a possibility 
considering the extensive strides Citigroup took to raise capital during 2008.  
Citigroup made a $4.5 billion common stock offer on April 30, 2008, with the 
intent of “improving the balance sheet.”215  More notably, Citigroup issued $25 
billion of perpetual preferred stock to the U.S. Treasury as part of the TARP 
Capital Purchase Program on December 31, 2008.216  These actions could be 
considered indicative of the serious problem capital requirements posed for 
Citigroup during 2008.  Further investigation will likely reveal whether 
Citigroup should have known of this potential problem at the time it made its 
pro forma disclosures in the 2007 Annual Report. 
 
 210. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 401, 116 Stat. 745, 785–87 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 211. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 115 (Feb. 23, 2007). 
 212. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 76 (Feb. 22, 2008).  The Company raised 
over $30 billion to increase its capital base and on a pro forma basis would have increased several 
of its capital ratios. 
 213. § 401, 116 Stat. at 785–87; Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 76 (Feb. 22, 
2008). 
 214. See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 76–77 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 215. Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Prices $4.5 Billion Common Stock Offering (Apr. 30, 
2008), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2008/080430a.htm. 
 216. Citigroup released its first progress report of the use of its TARP funds in February 
2009. Press Release, Citigroup Inc. Citi Issues First Quarterly Progress Report on Its Use of 
TARP Capital (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/090203 
a.htm. 
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3. Disclosure of Code of Ethics and Audit Committee Financial Expert 
Did Not Prevent Losses 
SOX also required the company to disclose whether it has a code of ethics 
and whether the audit committee has a financial expert.217  While these 
enhanced disclosure requirements arguably provide investors with important 
information concerning general corporate governance, these likely played less 
of a role in the context of the mortgage-related risks.  Citigroup indicated in 
both its 2006 and 2007 Annual Reports that it has a company-wide Code of 
Conduct that is supplemented by a Code of Ethics for Financial 
Professionals.218  Citigroup also directed readers to its website for additional 
information concerning its corporate governance.  The Audit and Risk 
Management Committee Charter indicated that its membership included at 
least one member that qualified as an audit committee financial expert.219 
While these additional disclosure requirements provide some insight into a 
company’s corporate governance practices, the generality of these disclosures 
likely did little to shed light for investors on the tremendous mortgage-related 
risks the investment banks were facing.  In the context of these disclosures, 
investors may be more informed by the absence of a code of ethics or financial 
expert on the audit committee.  A company’s failure to maintain a code of 
ethics or include a financial expert on its audit committee would provide a 
warning to a potential investor about the company’s corporate governance 
when deciding whether to invest.  In the context of Citigroup, compliance with 
these SOX requirements did not prevent staggering losses, but perhaps their 
utilization indirectly mitigated the degree of losses sustained. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The United States entered a recession in 2007, millions of people lost their 
jobs, many homes entered foreclosure, and investment banks took billions of 
dollars in losses.220  Investment banks played a significant role in the 
popularization of subprime lending and growth in mortgage securitization.  
The losses incurred by investment banks refresh the public’s memory of 
Enron’s collapse that propelled the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law.  As SOX 
focused on protecting investors through reliable and accurate financial 
 
 217. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 406–07, 116 Stat. at 789–790. 
 218. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 96 (Feb. 23, 2007).  Financial 
professionals include positions concerning “finance, accounting, treasury, tax and investor 
relations.”  Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 97 (Feb. 23, 2007).  
 219. Citigroup Inc., Audit and Risk Management Committee Charter, at 1 (Jan. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/data/auditriskcharter.pdf?ieNo 
cache=809. 
 220. See discussion supra Part I. 
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disclosures, the question arises whether SOX had a role to play in protecting 
investors of investment banks from the current crisis. 
It is clear there are SOX provisions applicable to the mortgage-related 
activity of investment banks.  SOX charged management of investment banks 
with responsibility for establishing internal control systems to address financial 
reporting for “significant” accounts.221  Given the tremendous volume and 
complexity of investment banks mortgage-related transactions, these accounts 
should likely be considered “significant.”222  As a result, investment banks 
should have instituted controls to address the valuation and disclosure of 
mortgage-related activity in the financial statements.223  Of particular concern 
is whether the disclosure of off-balance sheet relationships used by investment 
banks for mortgage activities were sufficiently disclosed prior to investment 
banks’ recorded losses.224  A further concern is whether disclosure of pro 
forma data for capital requirements made prior to the significant capital raising 
activities during 2008 were sufficient to not be misleading.225  While SOX 
triggered disclosures regarding the existence of a code of ethics and the 
presence of financial experts on the audit committee, these disclosures likely 
did not provide information sufficiently specific to alert investors to the 
mortgage-related risks investment banks incurred.226 
Further investigation is necessary to assess whether the investment bank’s 
financial statements violated SOX.  If investment banks were compliant, this 
may suggest that SOX is not effectively carrying out its purpose of enhancing 
protection for investors.  As the broad reach of the economic recession has 
demonstrated, answering these questions is imperative to ascertain what reform 
measures should be taken to protect not only investors, but the general public 
as well. 
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